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Public procurement constitutes a large and increasing part of economic activity both 
in developed and developing economies. According to the OECD, public procure-
ment has amounted to about 15%-16% of GDP among its member countries in the 
recent past. The EU Commission has estimated that each year, different levels of 
government spend about 20% of EU’s GDP to procure goods, works and services 
(European Commission 2012). Unfortunately for the tax payers, there are relatively 
few comparative empirical analyses of how different types of auction designs, such 
as first price sealed bid auctions, scoring auctions, average bid auctions, or beauty 
contests, perform when the public sector purchases a certain basic product or ser-
vice. Among the most notable exceptions are the analyses by Marion (2007) and 
Lewis and Bajari (2011) on US highway and roadwork contracts, by Athey, Levin 
and Seira (2011) on US timber auctions, and by Decarolis (2013, 2014) and Decar-
olis and Branzoli (2014) on Italian road construction and maintenance contracts.1 
We contribute to this literature by comparing the behavior of the procurement 
agents and the entry and bidding decisions of firms in a setting where the procured 
product is simple and where not just two, but three different auction formats have 
been used.  
 Our data come from Sweden and refer to public procurement auctions of a 
clearly defined low-tech product, internal cleaning service contracts. Fundamental 
for our study is that the contracts for these services have been auctioned by Swedish 
municipalities using first price sealed bid (‘price only’) auctions, scoring auctions, 
                                                 
1 In a seminal study, (List and Lucking-Reiley 2000) use sports-card experiments to compare out-
comes between Vickrey sealed-bid auctions and uniform-price auctions. See also (Bhattacharya, 
Roberts and Sweeting 2014), who analyze how the pre-auction allocation of entry-rights works com-
pared to unregulated entry in the context of first-price auctions, and (Roberts and Sweeting 2013), 
who compares the performance of auctions with simultaneous and sequential entry.  
 3 
and beauty contests. The reason for the observed variety in auction design is that 
our data come from two regimes that differ in how the law regulated procurement 
activity.2 During the first regime, the less stringent procurement law of the 1990s 
was in place. At the time, the Swedish procurement law allowed the municipalities 
exceptionally high degrees of freedom in choosing how to procure the services and, 
in particular, in how to pick the winner. The municipalities ended up using beauty 
contest auctions. In such an auction, the auctioneer does not commit to an award 
(allocation) rule and yet ex post pays, if she so wishes, attention to non-price criteria 
when choosing the winner (Klemperer 2002, Yoganarasimhan 2013). During the 
second regime, the much stricter procurement law of 2008 was in place. In this re-
gime, the Swedish municipalities had to commit either to a first price sealed bid 
auction or to a scoring auction, with an explicit award rule and weights, when it 
procured the services.3 
 The cleaning contracts procured by Swedish municipalities provide a good 
testing ground for us for two further reasons. First, cleaning services have a very 
simple production process that should make them amenable to being procured. The 
service is simple to contract on and, as we will argue, does not differ much in quality 
ex ante. Due to this relative homogeneity of the product, there should be relatively 
few reasons to depart from the policy of granting the contract to the lowest bidder 
(for a similar argument, but in a different context, see Di Tella and Schargrodsky 
                                                 
2 Sweden applied the EU procurement law already in the early 1990s and also subsequently. The 
Swedish rules were relatively lax in the 1990s, because the European rules of that time allowed high 
degrees of freedom in organizing procurements. Our research question is thus of interest for all 
countries applying the EU directives and for all developed countries considering how to improve 
the design of public procurement auctions. 
3 In a scoring auction, the procurement bureaucrat announces and commits to an explicit award rule 
that balances the non-price (quality) attributes and price (Che 1993, Asker and Cantillon 2008, 
2010).  
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2003, Bandiera, Prat and Valletti 2009).4 And yet, we can observe how the Swedish 
municipalities used beauty contests and scoring auctions, in addition to the standard 
price only auctions, to acquire these services, and how the firms responded. Second, 
an important aspect of the institutional environment that we study is that the public 
procurement auctions in our data happen in a relatively homogenous environment. 
In each municipality, the principals are the inhabitants of the municipalities and the 
agents the municipal council or more concretely, the procurement bureaucrats 
working under the council’s management. 
 Our main results are as follows: First, we find that in the old regime, condi-
tional on procuring, the municipalities resorted systematically to beauty contests, 
as no municipality committed to an explicit award rule.5 In contrast, one third of 
the auctions in the new regime are price only, and the rest are scoring auctions. 
Second, the raw data show that in the beauty contests, the lowest bidder did not win 
58% of the time, and conditional on not choosing the lowest bidder, the municipal-
ities end up paying on average 43% more than the lowest bid. In the scoring auc-
tions, the corresponding percentages are lower, 35% and 20%.6 Third, consistent 
with the raw data, our estimates from a discrete choice model suggest that the price 
sensitivity of the municipal procurement bureaucrats is about twice as large in the 
scoring auctions as in the beauty contests.7 Fourth, there is less actual entry to the 
scoring and price only auctions than in the beauty contests. Importantly, the nature 
of entry also changed. The new regime led to decreased participation and winning 
                                                 
4 Bajari, McMillan and Tadelis (2009) compare auctions and negotiations in procurement and stress 
tradeoffs between hard-to-observe quality and price when objects are complex and contractual de-
sign incomplete. In our case, exactly the opposite holds: Objects are simple and contractual design 
complete, at least when compared to the procurement of aircrafts and the like. See also Tadelis 
(2012) and Cameron (2000). 
5 For example, no municipality chose to have a scoring rule that would have provided content to 
what the criterion of “best economic value” means. 
6 In the price only auctions, they are obviously zero. 
7 The price sensitivity of the auctioneer is, by design, infinite in the price only auctions, conditional 
on the reservation price not binding.  
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probabilities by the municipalities’ own inhouse-units. Conditional on price, these 
units were more likely to be chosen in the beauty contests. Finally, our instrumental 
variable (IV) estimations indicate that there is a strong inverse relation between 
actual (as opposed to potential) entry and minimum and winning bids. Our baseline 
IV estimates suggest that controlling for potential entry, the entry elasticity of win-
ning bids is about -0.8. This result is robust to allowing for weak and for ‘just plau-
sibly’ exogenous instruments (Conley, Hansen and Rossi 2012), as well as to a 
number of alternative model specifications. The entry effect explains why the mu-
nicipalities ended up paying roughly the same for the cleaning services in all three 
auction formats, despite them being more price sensitive in the scoring and price 
only auctions.  
 We can relate these results of ours to the prior literature from a number of 
angles. First, our finding that there is less actual entry in the price only and scoring 
auctions relative to the beauty contests is related to what Decarolis (2013, 2014) 
has documented for Italian procurements on public works, where first-price auc-
tions replaced average bid auctions.8 Lewis and Bajari (2011) build a structural 
model of scoring auctions and evaluate how they perform relative to first-price auc-
tions in US highway procurements.9 We cannot detect any major differences in the 
                                                 
8 A related branch in the prior literature deals with abnormally low bids and explains the practice of 
not allowing such low bids to win. The procurement agent may want to choose some other than the 
lowest bid, if choosing the bid is associated with a significant risk of cost overruns, see e.g. Lewis 
(1986), Bucciol, Chillemi and Palazzi (2013), Chang, Cheng and Salmon (2014) or contractor de-
fault (Calveras, Ganuza and Hauk 2004, Burguet, Ganuza and Hauk 2012). Concerns of this sort 
appear to be mostly relevant for larger construction projects and public works. We have found no 
anecdotes or media coverage that would suggest that cost overruns or contractor defaults are im-
portant in the procurement of cleaning services in Swedish municipalities.  
9 Athey, Levin and Seira (2011) study how entry and bidding patters differ in timber auctions that 
used either open or sealed bid procedures. They find that the sealed bid auctions invite smaller bid-
ders and increase the likelihood that they win the auction. Eklöf (2005) uses Swedish data on the 
procurement of road painting contracts to explore the social costs of not assigning the contract to 
the most (cost) efficient firm. He also compares how the first-price mechanism compares to a sec-
ond-price auction. Cameron (2000) compares first price sealed bid auctions with negotiations using 
US data (see also Bajari, McMillan and Tadelis 2009).  
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key procurement outcomes, such as actual entry or procurement costs, between the 
price only and scoring auctions. 
 Second, our analysis complements Coviello and Mariniello (2014), who em-
phasize the pros and cons of disclosure requirements.10 We study beauty contests, 
which often are said to be opaque and subject to suspicions of favoritism 
(Klemperer 2002, Tadelis 2012).11 The stricter procurement law disciplined the be-
havior of the Swedish procurement bureaucrats by forcing them to abandon the 
practice of using beauty contests. It also increased their price-sensitiveness, condi-
tional on the received bids. However, a (n unintended) consequence of the stricter 
and more transparent rules seems to be that fewer firms were willing to enter.  
 Finally, our results suggest that a primary channel through which the adjust-
ment in the different auction designs takes place is the number of bidders. This 
finding links our analysis to the rapidly growing literature on endogenous partici-
pation and selective entry in auctions (e.g. Li and Zheng (2009, 2012), Li and Zhang 
(2010), Krasnoktskaya and Seim (2011), Athey et. al (2011) Marmer, Shneyerov 
and Xu (2013), Xu (2013), Roberts and Sweeting (2013), Coviello and Mariniello 
(2014)). Unlike most of these prior analyzes, we provide insights on the effects of 
entry restrictions and on the (endogenous) relation between the actual entry and 
procurement costs. More generally, the link between the control of entry by the 
procurement bureaucrat, actual entry and procurement outcomes appears to be com-
plex and vary across the different auction formats. These links remain, despite some 
                                                 
10 The procurement agent may also have preferences over a corporate attribute, such as the size and 
locality of the firms. In such a case, he may use an explicit bid preference program that awards the 
contract to the lowest preferred bidder, provided that its bid is close enough to the lowest bid (e.g., 
McAfee and McMillan (1989), Vagstad (1995)). Marion (2007) analyze US highway procurement 
auctions and contrasts outcomes in regular first-price auctions with auctions in which an explicit bid 
preference program for US small businesses was in place. He found that the subsidy program in-
creased the procurement costs a little, possibly due to reduced entry by larger firms. See also Kras-
nokutskaya and Seim (2011). 
11 Yoganarasimhan (2013) provides the first structural analysis of beauty contest auctions, using 
data on private online freelancing auctions. 
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important recent contributions, e.g. (Bhattacharya, Roberts and Sweeting 2014), 
largely unexplored territory.  
In the following section, we describe the legal and institutional environment 
in which the public procurements that we study were organized. Section three is 
devoted to describing our data. In section four, we present our main results. We 
offer brief conclusions in section five.  
 
2 Institutional environment 
2.1 Public procurement by municipalities  
Public procurement by the Swedish municipalities refers to the process through 
which they acquire goods, works and services from private suppliers. Our procure-
ment data cover two periods, or regimes as we will call them henceforth. The first 
(old) regime runs from 1990 to 1998 in our data and the second (new) from 2009 
to 2010. The municipalities were allowed to freely choose whether to procure or to 
produce in-house during both regimes. However, conditional on a municipality hav-
ing decided to procure, its procurement activities are governed by law. Before we 
describe the relevant laws and how they differed between the two regimes, we 
briefly explain how the procurements were organized.12  
 In our data, a single procurement is an instance where a municipality pur-
chases internal cleaning services for one or more of its buildings and premises. The 
bidders are Swedish firms that provide cleaning services. A procurement can con-
sist of one or more sealed-bid auctions, each allocating a single cleaning service 
contract to the winning bidder. This means that there can for example be a number 
                                                 
12 We take municipalities’ decisions about the number of cleaning service contracts that they pro-
cured, as well as their characteristics, as given. It is of course entirely possible that some municipal-
ities decided to procure cleaning services for, say, some of their schools while keeping the cleaning 
of others in-house. For a study of the behavior and market orientation of the municipalities of a 
neighboring Scandinavian country (Denmark), see Christoffersen and Paldam (2003). 
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of buildings and premises for which the firms bid at the same time. However, com-
binatorial bidding was not applied: During both regimes, the firms have been in-
structed to submit one bid per contract and the municipalities should accordingly 
have made decisions “contract-by-contract”.  
 
2.2 Procurement process and legislation 
During the first regime that our data cover, public procurement in Sweden was gov-
erned by the Public Procurement Act (“Lag 1992:1528 om offentlig upphandling, 
LOU”). 13 While the law was not yet in force in 1990-1993, the rules that applied 
then were essentially the same as under the Public Procurement Act. The law was 
based on the EU rules that prevailed at the time. During the second regime, public 
procurement of the type of services we study here was governed by the Public Pro-
curement Act (“Lag 2007:1091 om offentlig upphandling, LOU”). This new na-
tional law was effective as of January 1, 2008. It was a direct consequence of the 
2004 EU procurement directive, 2004/18/EC.14  
 
Entry modes and timing of events 
Both the old and new laws allowed for four types of entry modes (called Simplified, 
Open, Restricted, Negotiated). The main difference between these four modes is 
                                                 
13 This law followed the COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 92/50/EEC of 18 June 1992 relating to the coor-
dination of procedures for the award of public service contract. We describe some parts of the laws 
in Appendix 1. 
14 Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on the 
coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts and 
public service contracts. 
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that two of them (Simplified, Open) allowed free entry, while the other two (Re-
stricted, Negotiated) did not.15 
 The timing of events in the procurement process is roughly as follows: First, 
conditional on having decided to procure the cleaning of (at least some of) the prem-
ises and buildings that a municipality owns and/or rents, the municipal procurement 
bureaucrats choose the auction format. Then, they choose whether to allow for free 
entry or not, and conditional on not allowing free entry, which firms to invite.16 
After seeing the call for tenders, the (invited) firms make the participation decision 
and submit their bids. In the final stage, conditional on seeing which firms partici-
pate in the auction and the bids that the firms have submitted, the municipal pro-
curement bureaucrats choose the winner, according to the award criteria to which 
they have committed (if any; see below).  
 It is important to point out that in contrast to the first regime, the award of a 
procurement contract in the second regime followed a two-step procedure after the 
bids had been submitted: In the first step, bids were screened against mandatory 
qualification and exclusion criteria. The bids that did not meet these criteria were 
disqualified.17 In the second step, qualified bids were evaluated according to the 
pre-specified award rule. This difference may have affected the entry process; we 
return to this question in the robustness analysis.  
 
                                                 
15 While negotiations were allowed in some of these procedures (see, e.g., chapter 5, “Procurement 
of services”, in the Public Procurement Act, LOU 1992:1528), they were not used in the procure-
ments that we study. 
16 Conditional on restricting entry, the law allowed the municipalities to quite freely decide how 
many and which firms to invite. 
17 The content of the calls for tender and the preparation of a bid were more detailed and involved 
in the new regime than in the old regime. For example, unlike in the old regime, they now include a 
comprehensive set of mandatory qualification and exclusion criteria and rather detailed instructions 
of how the bidders are expected to show that they meet these criteria. However, the service in itself, 
and the technical specifications that describe how e.g. the work is to be done, remained by and large 
the same. 
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Supplier selection in the old procurement law 
The following features of the old law are central for us: First, conditional on decid-
ing to procure, the law allowed the municipalities to decide whether to allow open 
entry or not. Second, as a general guiding principle, the lowest bidder should have 
won. However, there was an exception to this “lowest bid wins” -rule: A munici-
pality had the freedom to deem that some other bid (than the lowest) was “most 
advantageous economically” when quality, environmental aspects, service and 
maintenance etc. were also taken into account. Importantly for us, the law did not 
force municipalities to commit to an award rule or to use any explicit scoring 
weights. It is also worth pointing out that the law did not mention for example the 
locality of the bidder as an allowable non-price dimension, but seems not to have 
ruled it out either.  
It is illustrative of the atmosphere of the time that the freedom allowed by the 
law to deviate from choosing the lowest bid was seen as beneficial. The following 
quote from a book by a public sector lawyer testifies to this:  
“The tender having the lowest price offered should be accepted.  If it has 
been stated in the advertisement that the most economically advantageous 
tender will be accepted, factors specified therein can be taken into consider-
ation in the assessment of tenders. The factors can be stated according to a 
degree of priority (LOU 1 ch. 22§), however this is not a requirement. On 
the contrary, it can be advantageous to state in the advertisement that such 
factors are non-prioritized, since this increases the possibility of being able 
to choose the contractor.” (Löfving 1994, 65) (Our translation, and ital-
ics). 
This citation shows how the Swedish procurement law allowed during the first re-
gime the municipalities exceptionally high degrees of freedom in choosing how to 
procure the services and, in particular, picking the winner by not committing to an 
award rule. This means that the set of auction formats that was available to the 
procurement bureaucrats was {Beauty contest, Scoring, Price only}. 
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Supplier selection in the new procurement law 
Article 53 of the new law requires that the call for tender specifies how bids will be 
evaluated in the second step, after the bids have been screened against mandatory 
qualification and exclusion criteria in the first step. This means that the terms of the 
supplier selection method are to be posted in advance. The municipalities can either 
use the lowest-price-principle, which corresponds to first price sealed bid auction, 
or the so-called economically most advantageous tender (EMAT) principle, which 
corresponds to a regular scoring auction. Explicit weighing of different criteria 
should be the guiding principle when EMAT is applied (for a more detailed account, 
see e.g. Bergman and Lundberg 2013). This means that in the new regime, the set 
of auction formats that is relevant for our purposes and that was available to the 
procurement bureaucrats was {Scoring, Price only}.18 
 
3 Data 
3.1 Data sources 
Our bidding and procurement data come from two surveys. The first one was ad-
ministered to all Swedish municipalities asking them for procurement documents 
regarding internal cleaning services (Lundberg 2005). The documents are call for 
tenders or contract notice, technical specification, list of bidders, bids, and the de-
cision protocol stating the winner of the contract. Information about the procure-
ments for the second survey was collected from a procurement database that keeps 
                                                 
18 To be more specific, the current procurement law also allows the procurement entities to arrange 
“quality only” auctions, in which the procuring entity sets a price and then potential suppliers com-
pete in quality only; see Bergman and Lundberg (2013). There are no such auctions in our data, but 
they have been used when other types of services, such as elderly care, have been acquired.  
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track of calls for tenders in Sweden.19 Additional information was gathered from 
the municipalities that according to the procurement database had organized at least 
one procurement auction. 
The first survey is the source of the data for the first of our regimes (1990-1998) 
and the second survey is the source of the data for the latter regime (2009-2010). In 
the first survey, the response rate was 79.5 %. The survey responses show that 26% 
of the municipalities that replied to the survey organized at least one procurement 
auction in cleaning services during 1990-98. More than 90% of the data of the first 
survey refers to the latter half of period 1990-1998. The second survey was carried 
out in 2011. We have supplemented the survey data with municipality characteris-
tics, obtained from Statistics Sweden (SCB).  
 
3.2 Description of the data 
Verification of the auction formats 
A look at the procurement documents of the old regime reveals that no municipality  
committed to an award rule. In other words,  every municipality grabbed the free-
dom allowed by the old law.  The situation is quite different in the new regime. A 
perusal of the procurement documents of the new regime shows that all municipal-
ities specified a scoring rule, unless they used the lowest-price principle. The spe-
cific design of scoring rules differs over procurements (Bergman and Lundberg 
2013), but it was described in detail either in words or in combination with a math-
ematical expression.20  
                                                 
19 The data base is maintained by Visma Commerce AB. This is the largest data base in Sweden and 
it covers approximately 90 percent of all procurements. It didn’t exist at the time of the first survey. 
20 In a representative case, it gave a 0.35-0.45 weight for the price, and 0.55-0.65 weight for the 
description of how the cleaning service is to be delivered and for experience. 
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 In sum, all of the auctions of the old regime are (a good proxy for) beauty 
contests. The two auction formats of the new regime correspond to first-price sealed 
bid and scoring auctions.  
 
Nature of the procured service and normalization of the bids 
In our data, 42% of the premises to be cleaned are schools, 39% are day care centers 
(and the like), 11% are offices and the rest are other types of premises. A single 
contract can cover more than one premise. On average, the total size of the premises 
to be cleaned in a contract is 3800 square meters, but the distribution is skew. The 
median is 1100 square meters. The average cleaning frequency is 232 days per year 
and the average contract length is 2.2 years. In a typical (average) procurement, 4 
cleaning contracts were auctioned.  
 The extensive documentation available to us on the technical specifications 
of the procurements and the specifics of the bids suggest strongly that there is little 
room for ex ante quality differences in the cleaning services provided, especially 
after controlling for firm type. That is, it is very hard to see how there could be 
major discernible quality differences between the bids for a specific premise or 
building (see also Appendix 2). The most compelling support for this claim is pro-
vided by the technical specifications of the procurement instructions. The procure-
ment instructions are in general very detailed. Besides including a detailed descrip-
tion of the premises to be cleaned, the frequency of cleaning, cleaning method, 
cleaning substances that are preferred and cleaning equipment that is to be em-
ployed, they also go into much more minute detail. For example, it is common to 
state requirements as to the professional education of cleaning staff to be used. Sim-
ilarly, the monitoring of cleaning is often specified in detail, and it is standard to 
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require the firm to inform the municipality on several features of the working pro-
cess, to provide records of hours of work, workforce and machinery employed etc. 
As if this wasn’t enough, in several instances the procurement instructions go into 
great detail as to how each space (e.g. classroom, toilet) is to be cleaned.  
 While the above argumentation suggests that it is quite hard to differentiate 
one-self quality-wise, we do not claim that there are no ex ante quality differences. 
We argue that the product we study is simpler and more homogenous than the prod-
ucts and contracts that have been considered in the prior comparative work of auc-
tion designs. For example, in contrast to the US highway procurements studied by 
Lewis and Bajari (2011), it is hard to believe that one would obtain significant wel-
fare gains by tilting the award rule in some non-price dimension via a scoring rule.21 
 Our measure of the bids refers to the total price of the cleaning service per 
square meter (lot size) and day (frequency). This normalization ensures that the raw 
bids are largely comparable. In our econometric analysis, we also control for the 
type of the premise and other characteristics of the contracts and allow for scale 
economies. The bids are expressed in 2013 Swedish krona (1 €  8.96 krona at the 
end of 2013). 
  
Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 gives a set of basic descriptive statistics, conditioning on auction type. Ac-
tual entry refers to the number of submitted bids (n) in an auction. Potential entry 
(N) refers to the total number of firms that submitted at least one bid in a given 
municipality in our data; for a similar approach, see, e.g. (Li and Zhang 2010, 
                                                 
21 Moreover, there seems to be few reasons to expect that cross-firm differences in quality would 
have changed over time or be significant across the auction formats we consider. 
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Athey, Levin and Seira 2011, Li och Zheng 2012, Athey, Coey and Levin 2013).22 
Free entry is used as the entry mode much more often in the scoring and price only 
auctions than in the beauty contests. There is less actual entry into them, but roughly 
the same amount of potential entry. Strikingly, Table 1 also shows that in the beauty 
contests, the lowest bidder does not win 58% of the time, and conditional on not 
choosing the lowest bidder, the municipalities end up paying on average 43% more 
than the lowest bid. In the scoring auctions, the corresponding percentages are 
lower, 35% and 20%.23 The average winning bids are almost the same in all three 
auction formats.  
 
[TABLE 1 HERE] 
 
While not shown in the table, there are four main types of firms that participate in 
the auctions (see also Appendix 3, Table A1). They are large nationally active firms 
(National), in-house units of the municipalities that participate in the auctions as 
self-standing operative units (Inhouse), small local firms (Local), which we define 
as those firms that are not national or inhouse-units and that participate in auctions 
of only one municipality, and regional firms (Regional), which we define as those 
firms that are not national or inhouse-units and that participate in auctions of more 
than one municipality.  
 
                                                 
22 We measure potential entry separately for large and small contracts in each municipality, with the 
threshold for a large contract being the 80th percentile of the distribution of the (total) size of the 
premises included in the contract. This means that all auctions in the same size group of a given 
municipality have the same set of potential bidders.  
23 In the price only auction they are of course zero. 
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4 Main results 
4.1 Behaviour of procurement bureaucrats 
Unlike what is typically done in the empirical auction and procurement literature, 
we start by describing the behavior of procurement bureaucrats.  
 
Discrete choice analysis of the choice of the winner 
We study the procurement bureaucrats’ choice of the winning bid using a random 
utility model (McFadden 1974). A standard econometric approach to implement 
such an analysis is the conditional logit.24 The model uses the bids as the unit of 
observation and allows us to condition out all additively separable effects that are 
related to observable and unobservable characteristics of the municipals (and their 
procurement bureaucrats), observable and unobservable features of the used auction 
format, and to observable and unobservable premise and contract characteristics.  
 Table 2 reports the estimation results from a set of Conditional logit models. 
The key explanatory variables are Bid (in krona per square meter and per day) and 
its interaction with the auction type indicators, Bid  Beauty_contest and Bid  
Scoring. The more negative the coefficient of Bid is, the more weight the price gets 
in the decision making of the procurement bureaucrats when they choose the win-
ner. Note, in particular, than in the price only auctions, the weight on price is ‘infi-
nitely large’, because the bids completely determine the choice of the winner. Such 
auctions are therefore excluded from these estimations. The coefficients of the in-
teraction terms tell us how the price sensitivity of the procurement bureaucrats var-
                                                 
24 We provide a more detailed explanation of the conditional logit in Appendix 2. See also e.g. 
Cameron and Trivedi (2005) for a textbook treatment.  
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ies with the other two auction formats. In Model 1, there are no additional explan-
atory variables besides the two bid terms. For Model 2, we additionally include the 
number of bids that each firm submitted in the particular procurement and the total 
number of bids that each firm submitted during the entire observation period. We 
use the former variable as a control for the possibility that the municipalities take 
in the account how active the firms are in the particular procurement event (i.e., the 
potential multi-unit nature of the procurement).25 We use the latter variable as a 
crude proxy for the reputation of the firms in the market. In Model 3, we replicate 
the estimations of Model 1, except that we now add the firm type dummies (Local, 
Regional, National), interacted with the indicators for the auction types, as controls. 
Model 4 is a restricted version of Model 3, as we impose the restriction that in the 
scoring auctions the type of the firm does not matter. Finally, Model 5 includes as 
controls firm-specific fixed effects, with the exception that all firms that submit less 
than 20 bids in the data are grouped into a single firm category.  
 Table 2 yields three main findings. First, the coefficients of the two interac-
tion terms are negative and highly significant. Second, the coefficient of Bid  
Beauty_contest is clearly smaller (in absolute value) than the coefficient of Bid  
Scoring. The price sensitivity of the procurement bureaucrats is more than two 
times greater in the scoring auctions than in the beauty contests. This increase in 
the price sensitivity is robust across the various specifications that we report in the 
table. While not shown in the table, the difference in the coefficients is highly sig-
nificant, with p-values being less than 0.05 in each column. The third main finding 
                                                 
25 It is worth pointing out that combinatorial bidding was not allowed and there are no combinatorial 
bids in the data. This means the winner should have been picked object-by-object. But because in a 
multi-unit context such a procedure is a source of inflexibility that can lead to an inefficient alloca-
tion (see, e.g., Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001, 2003)), the municipalities may have tried to take into 
account the aggregate outcome, i.e., the fact that in these multi-unit procurements, many firms sub-
mitted a bid for more than one object. It is thus possible that they have for example tried to reduce 
transaction costs. The number of bids per procurement is a control for this.  
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is that, conditional on the submitted bids, the inhouse-units are more likely than the 
other types of firms to win in the beauty contests. In the beauty contests, the will-
ingness-to-pay for the cleaning services of the inhouse-units appears to be roughly 
0.4-0.5 krona (per square meter and per day) higher than for the services of the other 
types of firms. This is a substantive amount, when compared to the mean of the 
winning bids (0.64, see Table 1). The same is not true for the scoring auctions: The 
firm type indicators are jointly insignificant and their coefficients small in absolute 
value in the scoring auctions (cf. Model 4).  
 
[TABLE 2 HERE] 
 
Use of free entry 
The raw data suggest that the procurement bureaucrats use free entry more often in 
the scoring and price only auctions than in the beauty contests. To explore this fur-
ther, Table 3 reports a set of descriptive Linear Probability (OLS) Models. The de-
pendent variable is a binary indicator for the use of free entry in an auction and the 
standard errors are clustered at the level of procurements.  
 
[TABLE 3 HERE 
 
In the first model, the only explanatory variables are the binary indicators for the 
scoring and price only auctions, with the beauty contests being the omitted cate-
gory. The estimates from this model show that, compared to the beauty contests, 
the scoring and price only auctions are associated with more frequent use of free 
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entry. The second model includes, in addition to the auction format -indicators, mu-
nicipality fixed effects.26 This model confirms the findings of the first model.  
 For the third model, we add a number of further control variables. They come 
in two groups. The first group of control variables refers to the characteristics of 
auction and the service contract that is being auctioned. The variables include type 
of the premise (four categories: School, Office, Day-care center, Other), the length 
(in years) of the contract (Contract_length), the number of years over which the 
contract can optionally be extended if the municipality so decides (Extension), the 
(scaled) number of days during which the cleaning takes place (Frequency) and its 
square, and the (scaled) size of the premises covered by the contract (Size_of_prem-
ises) and its square. The second group of control variables consists of municipal 
unemployment rate (Unemployment), population density (Population_density, in 
thousands of inhabitants per the geographical size of the municipality), share of 
inhabitants having a higher education (Education) and a binary indicator that ob-
tains a value of one for those municipalities where leftwing parties have more than 
50 percent of the seats in the municipal council (Red_majority).27 We also include 
the (natural) logarithm of potential entry as a control (Ln(N)), as well as a piecewise 
linear trend to account for e.g. technological development within the two regimes 
(Trend) that our data cover.  
 The estimates of the third model show that the binary indicators for the for-
mats of the scoring and price only auctions obtain positive coefficients and that only 
the former is significant at the conventional significance levels. The two indicators 
                                                 
26 We group all those municipalities that organize less than five auctions in our data and introduce 
one group-specific fixed effect for them.  
27 While not perfect, this is a parsimonious way to capture the main division in Swedish politics E.g. 
Aronsson, Lundberg and Wikström (2000, 192) write: “These two variables [based on council de-
composition into leftwing (socialist) and rightwing (non-socialist)] are assumed to control for the 
widespread belief that socialists and non-socialists usually have different views about public spend-
ing and that a fragmented parliament might find it hard to hold back public spending.” 
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are nevertheless jointly significant, and the latter significant at 10% level. Moreo-
ver, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that they are equal. Therefore, in the fourth 
model, we impose the coefficients of the two binary indicators to be equal. Now we 
obtain again a positive and statistically highly significant coefficient, indicating that 
the scoring and price only auctions are associated with more frequent use of free 
entry than the beauty contests. 
  
4.2 Behavior of firms  
Following the prior literature (Lewis and Bajari 2011, Athey, Levin and Seira 2011, 
Athey, Coey and Levin 2013, Decarolis 2013, 2014), we explore the relation be-
tween the auction outcomes and formats by regressing entry and bids on the binary 
indicators that capture the format of the auctions. We adopt this reduced form ap-
proach, because building and estimating a structural model for each auction format 
would be beyond the scope of this study: As far as we are aware, the literature on 
the structural estimation of scoring auctions and beauty contests is scant, with the 
recent work by (Lewis and Bajari 2011) and (Yoganarasimhan 2013) representing 
the first important contributions.  
 
Entry 
In Table 4, we report two count-regressions (Poisson-models) and two OLS-regres-
sions. In the count models, the dependent variable is the number of submitted bids 
(n), whereas in the OLS-regressions, it is the logarithm of the number of submitted 
bids (Ln(n)).28 In each specification, we include the binary indicators for Scoring, 
                                                 
28 We use cluster the standard errors at the procurement level. This means that the estimations are 
robust to a misspecification in the Poisson model’s variance. 
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Price only, Free entry and the interactions of Scoring and Price only with Free 
entry. Scoring and Price only measure how much more (or less) there was entry in 
scoring and price only auctions when entry was not free, relative to similar beauty 
contests. The coefficient of Free entry measures whether free entry was associated 
with more entry in the beauty contests. The two interaction terms capture how the 
scoring and price only auctions differ from the beauty contests in this regard. More-
over, we include the logarithm of the number of potential entrants (Ln(N)), as well 
as the set of (other) controls, X  (School, Office, Day-care center, Contract_length, 
Extension, Frequency, Frequency2, Size_of_premises, Size_of_premises2, Unem-
ployment, Population_density, Education, Red_majority, Trend), and municipal 
fixed effects. The difference between the first and second (third and fourth) columns 
is that the coefficients of the interactions of Scoring and Price with Free entry are 
imposed to be equal as they turned out not to be different. A further reason to im-
pose this restriction is that in the clear majority of the scoring and price only auc-
tions entry was free; see the robustness analysis for additional discussion.  
 The specifications reported in Table 4 correspond closely to the reduced form 
of Li and Zheng (2009) that they use to explore the relation between entry proba-
bility and potential entry in their highway mowing auction data. The implied con-
ditional mean of the number of actual entrants (bidders) is 
( , ) exp( ' )E n W N N W  , where W is a vector that includes the auction format 
indicators and their interactions, vector of other controls X, as well as the munici-
pality fixed effects. As Li and Zheng (2009) mention, the coefficient of N () 
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measures whether the entry probability decreases as the potential number of en-
trants increases. 29 As the table shows, our estimate of  is 0.3-0.4 and highly sig-
nificant. Consistent with this, Li and Zheng (2009) report an estimate of 0.4. This 
result means that as the number of potential entrants increases, the probability of 
entry decreases. At the same time, the estimate means that the expected number of 
actual entrants increases with the number of potential entrants.30 
 
 [TABLE 4 HERE] 
 
Table 4 also shows that the coefficient of Free entry is positive and significant. This 
finding indicates that the use of free entry is associated with a larger number of 
submitted bids in the beauty contests. However, we find that the opposite is true in 
the scoring and price only auctions: The coefficients of the interaction terms be-
tween the free entry and auction format dummies are negative and jointly signifi-
cant. Because ( , ) exp( ' )E n W N N W
   implies 1( , ) exp( ' )nNE W N N W
  , 
these findings mean that holding other things constant, the entry probability is lower 
when free entry is allowed in the scoring and price only auctions than when it is 
allowed in the beauty contests.  
 
Average and minimum level of bids 
We next explore how the average level of bids as well as the minimum level of bids 
vary between the three auction formats and with the number of bidders. To this end, 
                                                 
29 Proxied by the ratio of actual (n) to potential entry (i.e., n/N) 
30 If potential entry, N, increases by one firm, the actual participation (n = Nq) may increase, even if 
entry probability, q, decreases (as our estimates suggest). That is, n/N = Nq/N = (q + (q/N)N) 
= q(1 + ) can be positive, even if the elasticity of entry probability w.r.t. potential entry, denoted  
here, is negative. Actual entry increases with potential entry, unless the response, , is very elastic.  
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we regress the logarithm of the bids (using all the bid data we have) and the loga-
rithm of the lowest bids (using the data on the lowest bids of each auction only) on 
the indicators of the auction formats, actual entry (Ln(n)), potential entry (Ln(N)), 
the vector of other controls (X), and the municipal fixed effects. Following the large 
and rapidly advancing literature on endogenous participation and selective entry in 
auctions e.g. (Li and Zheng 2009, 2012, Marmer, Shneyerov och Xu 2013, Gentry 
och Li 2014), we treat actual entry as endogenous.  
 To take the endogeneity of the number of actual bidders into account, we use 
Free entry and its interactions with Scoring and Price_only as the instruments. 
These variables are valid instruments, if the procurement bureaucrats’ decision to 
use the free entry mode affects bids only through its effect on the probability of 
entry. Our previous analysis shows (cf. Table 4) that these variables are relevant 
instruments: Our baseline first-stage specification is identical to the fourth column 
of Table 4, where the coefficients of interactions Free_entry  Scoring and 
Free_entry  Price_only are restricted to be equal. We explore the plausibility of 
our exclusion restrictions and the strength of our instruments in greater detail below.  
 Table 5 reports the results of the 2SLS estimations when we use the entire bid 
data and Table 6 the corresponding results when we use the lowest bids only. In 
both tables, we cluster the standard errors at the level of procurements. The first 
columns of the two tables report the baseline 2SLS results: In Table 5, the entry 
elasticity of the average submitted bid is about -0.4 in column 1, but the estimate is 
significant only at the 10% level. The indicators of the auction formats for the price 
only and scoring auctions are not significantly different from zero, nor from each 
other. The coefficient of the potential entry is insignificant, too. In Table 6, the 
baseline results show that the entry elasticity of the minimum submitted bid is about 
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-0.6, and the estimate is significant at better than the 1% level. Again, the indicators 
of the auction formats are not significantly different from zero, nor from each other. 
 
 [TABLE 5 AND 6 HERE] 
 
 The remaining columns of Table 5 and 6 explore the robustness of our base-
line findings. In the second column, we add firm type dummies in the regressions, 
understanding that they may be endogenous. In the third column we check if the 
effect of entry on bids is different in the scoring and price only auctions, compared 
to the beauty contests.31 Finally, in fourth and fifth columns, we explore the robust-
ness of our findings to excluding the (insignificant) auction format indicators from 
the second stage: In column 4, we drop them altogether from the analysis, whereas 
in column 5, we use them as additional instruments. As both tables show, our base-
line finding of there being a negative effect of actual entry on the bids is robust to 
these modeling changes. The coefficient of the potential entry is never significant. 
 
4.3 Procurement costs and level of winning bids 
We now turn to the analysis of procurement costs, which is an outcome of both the 
(optimal) award behavior of the procurement bureaucrats and the (equilibrium) en-
try and bidding behavior of firms. To this end, we report in Table 7 a set of 2SLS 
regressions in which the dependent variable is the logarithm of the winning bid of 
each auction. The specifications reported in the different columns correspond to 
those used in Table 6, including the choice of the instruments.32 This set of results 
                                                 
31 After first trying separate interactions of the scoring and price only auctions with the number of 
submitted bids, and finding them not to be statistically different (nor jointly significant), we imposed 
the same coefficient for the two interactions. 
32 We again cluster the standard errors at the procurement level. 
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allows us to explore how much the municipalities end up paying for the cleaning 
services and whether the procurement costs are related to the format of the auction 
and the number of actual bidders.  
 
 [TABLE 7 HERE] 
 
Again, the first column reports the baseline 2SLS results. The most important find-
ing is that the entry elasticity of the winning bid is nearly -0.80 and highly signifi-
cant. The remaining columns of the table explore the robustness of the baseline 
findings. They show that the result for the entry elasticity is stable. The coefficient 
of the indicator for the price only auctions is negative and borderline significant and 
the coefficient of the potential entry is, counterintuitively, positive and sometimes 
also significant at the 10% level. However, we would like to point out that the find-
ings on the price only auctions and potential entry are not a robust feature (see also 
below).  
 All models of Table 7 assume that the conditional mean of the winning bids 
is ( _ , , ) exp( ' )E Winning bid W n N n N W
   . Together with our first stage for-
mulation, this specification of the conditional mean implies that the (total) effect of 
potential entry on the winning bids, 
( _ , , )E Winning bid W n N
N

 , can be written as 







. This expression can be seen to roughly consist of the 
competitive (




  ) and entry (




  ) effects that Li and 
Zheng (2009) analyze using their structural approach. The key difference is that we 
allow for a direct effect of actual entry (number of submitted bids) on the bids, 
whereas their comparative statics work through participation probabilities. In our 
case, the (total) effect can be rewritten as 
1( )exp( ' )n N W      , where  is the 
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coefficient of N in the first stage. The sign of this expression is determined by 
( )   . Of the three terms, we can estimate ( , )   quite accurately, and they ob-
tain the expected signs ˆ ˆ( 0.8, 0.36)     .33  
 
4.4 Robustness analyses 
We have probed the robustness of our results on the determinants of the winning 
bids in a number of ways: 
 Weak instruments: We start by exploring the possibility that our instruments 
are weak. To this end, we consider the baseline IV model, reported in the first col-
umn of Table 7. We can apply Moreira’s (2003) conditional likelihood-ratio test 
(CLR-test) to this model  The CLR-test allows us to test the null hypothesis that the 
coefficient of the number of submitted bids is zero in the second stage, without 
assuming that the instruments are strong. The test rejects the null hypothesis firmly 
(p-value < 0.01). The weak-instrument-robust 95% confidence intervals associated 
with the statistic is [-1.59, -0.36]. Roughly put, this is the set of parameter values 
for α that are consistent with the data when we allow the instruments to be weak.34  
 Exclusion restriction: We can also evaluate the plausibility of our exclusion 
restriction, using the approach developed by Conley et al. (2012). This approach 
can be applied if one suspects that the exclusion restriction does not hold exactly. 
In our case, such a suspicion would amount to arguing that the use of free entry in 
the different auction formats is correlated with the unobservables influencing the 
winning bid, conditional on the actual and potential entry and the other observables.  
                                                 
33 Note that if we imposed (the clearly insignificant) coefficient of potential entry ( ) to be zero, 
the number of potential entrants would qualify as an instrument for our 2SLS estimations. The the-
oretical analyses of, e.g., Li and Zheng (2009, 2012) suggest that such an exclusion restriction would 
not, in general, be appropriate. 
34 More formally, the 95% confidence interval refers to those coefficient values for which the rejec-
tion probability is below 95%. 
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To relax the assumption that Free entry, Free entryScoring, and Free en-
tryPrice_only are strictly exogenous, we have to take into account that in our base-
line 2SLS estimations, the coefficients of Free entryScoring, and Free en-
tryPrice_only were set to be equal in the first stage. While our base results go 
through even if such a parameter restriction is not imposed, we continue keep it for 
simplicity here. It means that we have one interaction in the first stage, Free en-
try(Scoring + Price_only), where the expression in the parenthesis is equal to one 
if the auction format is either scoring or price only. To continue, let γ be a (2  1) 
vector of parameters that measures whether Free entry and the interaction can be 
excluded from the second stage of 2SLS. If γ = (0, 0) exactly, the variables have no 
direct effect on the winning bids. If, on the other hand, we allow a ‘prior’ distribu-
tion for γ, then we can discuss how close the exclusion restriction is to being satis-
fied. If it is likely that γ is close to zero (and if the probability that it is far away 
from zero decreases sufficiently rapidly), we can say that the instruments are plau-
sibly exogenous and explore how robust the results are to the small violations of 
the exclusion restriction.  
We have implemented the local-to-zero method of Conley et al. (2012), as 
follows. First, our prior is that γ is normally distributed. We allow for the followings 
means of the prior distribution, each in turn: {(0, 0), (0.1, 0.1), (-0.1, -0,1), (0, 0.1), 
(0.1, 0), (0, -0.1), (-0.1, 0)}. For example, (-0.1, 0) is roughly equivalent to assuming 
that the use of free entry in the beauty contests is typically associated with 10% 
decrease in the level of winning bids beyond its relation with firm participation, 
whereas the use of free entry would typically have no direct effect on the winning 
bids in the scoring and price only auctions. The variance of γ is set to (0.12, 0.12).  
Table 8 displays the results for the local-to-zero method. It shows that in each 
case, the coefficient of the submitted number of bids remains clearly negative. The 
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coefficients (elasticities) vary in range [-1.0, -0.6] and are mostly significant at bet-
ter than 5% level, and in two cases at better than 10% level. Based on these local-
to-zero estimates, we argue that our results are robust to the suspicion that the use 
of free entry is correlated with the unobservables influencing the winning bids. We 
stress that we are not considering minor deviations. Our local-to-zero analysis al-
lows the use of free entry to be associated with 10% increase or decrease in the level 
of winning bids (on and above the indirect effect via firm entry) in a rather rich 
fashion across the three auction formats.   
 
[TABLE 8 HERE] 
 
 Alternative measure for free entry: In the old regime, all firms knew when 
making the decision to enter whether or not entry was restricted (as captured by 
Free entry). However, we cannot rule out the possibility that in the new regime, the 
screening of bids against mandatory qualification and exclusion criteria after the 
bids had been submitted was used as a form of delayed entry restriction, which the 
firms did or could not anticipate perfectly. Indeed, as Table 1 already showed, the 
ex post screening of the bids resulted in a number of disqualifications. One could 
therefore argue that even though free entry was (nominally) used much more often 
in the new regime, the effective entry restrictions did not change as much.35 To ex-
plore this, we have considered an alternative indicator of free entry. It equals to 
Free entry but with the twist that in the new regime, it is set to zero (indicating 
restricted entry), if in a nominally free entry auction, the procurement bureaucrat is 
                                                 
35 We cannot rule out that there also is more red tape in the new regime: Rule-based procurement 
regulation and more formal procurement processes, characterized by detailed product requirements 
and bidder qualifications, may make procurement burdensome for potential bidders and increase the 
entry costs (e.g., Bandiera et al. 2009). 
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predicted to disqualify one or more bids with a high probability. We do not use the 
actual disqualifications, because the decision to disqualify one or more bids is made 
after the bids have been observed by the procurement bureaucrat.36 
 When we use the alternative indicator of free entry in the place of Free entry, 
and repeat all our main analyses (i.e., the estimations and analyses reported in Ta-
bles 4-8), our main findings remain intact. For example, the coefficient of the po-
tential entry (Ln(N)) is 0.33 (standard error = 0.088) in the first stage regression (cf. 
Table 4), which is close to what we reported earlier. The 2SLS estimate of the entry 
elasticity of the winning bid is -0.79 and highly significant.  
A further robustness check is in order: When we use the alternative indicator 
of free entry in the place of Free entry, there is more variation in this measure, 
conditional on the municipalities using the price only and scoring auctions. We can 
use this additional variation to explore the restrictiveness of the assumption that the 
coefficients of Free entryScoring, and Free entryPrice_only are equal in the first 
stage. When we replicate the analyses reported in Tables 4-7 using the alternative 
measure and without the first-stage coefficient restriction, all our results remain 
unchanged; see Appendix 3 for the details of these results.  
Alternative measures of potential entry: In our baseline analyses, we have 
measured potential entry using the total number of firms that submitted at least one 
bid in a given municipality in our data, calculated separately for large and small 
contracts (as measured by the size of the premises). While a similar approach has 
                                                 
36 The procedure to generate the predicted disqualifications is as follows: First, we calculate the 
number of disqualified bids for each auction. Second, we regress the number of disqualified bids on 
the auction and municipality characteristics, using data from the new regime only and a count-re-
gression (Poisson). Third, we code a binary indictor for each auction of the new regime so that it 
takes value one if the predicted probability that at least one bid is disqualified, is greater than 0.50. 
We set the indicator to zero otherwise. Our results are robust to using a higher threshold for the 
probability. Fourth, the alternative indicator for free entry is equal to Free entry, except for those 
auctions for which the indictor for the predicted disqualifications is one. These auctions are not 
considered to have had free entry for the purposes of our alternative free entry measure.  
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been used in the literature e.g. (Li and Zhang 2010, Li and Zheng 2012 and Athey, 
Coey and Levin 2013), it is useful to probe the robustness of our basic findings in 
this regard. First, we can consider alternative thresholds for a large contract. The 
threshold for a large contract has so far been the 80th percentile of the distribution 
of the total size of the premises, as calculated separately for each municipality. If 
we use the median of the municipality-specific distributions, our results on how the 
three auction formats differ and how the potential and actual entry affects bids, re-
main intact. In these models, the second stage coefficient of potential entry is how-
ever not significant. Second, one might ask whether there is a degree of non-linear-
ity in the relation between potential and realized entry. If we use  potential entry 
linearly (instead of logarithm) and its square, our results remain intact. The linear 
term obtains a positive and significant and the squared term a negative and signifi-
cant coefficient in the first stage where the dependent variable is the logarithm of 
the submitted number of bids. This finding supports the original specification of the 
potential entry in logarithms and suggests that the entry probabilities (as proxied 
by n/N) decrease with each additional potential entrant, but at a decreasing rate. Our 
main results are also unchanged if we add a square of the logarithm of the number 
of potential bidders to the baseline 2SLS model for the winning bids. In these mod-
els, the variables capturing potential entry are not significant in the second stage.  
 Alternative functional forms: We have re-run our baseline analyses using an 
alternative specification for the conditional mean. In the base line, the conditional 
mean of the winning bids is ( _ , , )E Winning bid W n N . exp( ' )n N W
   . If we 
use ( _ , , )E Winning bid W n N exp( ' )n N W      instead, our results remain 
unchanged.  
 Alternative estimation sample: It turns out that in our data, not all municipal-
ities organize procurements both during the old and new regime. If we restrict our 
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estimation sample to only those municipalities that organized procurements during 
both periods, the size of our estimation sample decreases considerably, to 623 auc-
tions.37 However, when we repeat the 2SLS analyses reported in Tables 6 and 7 for 
the minimum and lowest bids, we find that our results are robust to using this 
smaller sample. For example, the entry elasticity of the winning bids is -0.7 and, 
despite the smaller sample, is still significant at better than 10% level. 
. 
4.5 Discussion  
We use Figure 1 to illustrate the economic significance of our main findings. In the 
upper part of the figure, the left-hand graph displays the logarithm of the number 
of submitted bids for each auction format. It shows that there is less actual entry in 
the price only and scoring auctions. The right-hand graph shows the mean of the 
logarithm of the winning bids: In the raw data, the average winning bids are almost 
the same in all three auction formats, despite the procurement bureaucrats being 
less price sensitive in the beauty contests (as our conditional logit estimates 
showed). To show the importance of the entry effect for these data patterns, we use 
the 2SLS estimates from Table 7 (Models 1 and 4) to predict the level of winning 
bids in the scoring and price only auctions, had the entry remained at the observed 
level of the beauty contests. The results are displayed in the lower part of the figure: 
In the left-hand graph, we allow the auction formats to have a direct effect on the 
                                                 
37 We would like to point out that in this sub-sample, the municipalities organize price only auctions 
in the new regime less often than in the full sample: In the full sample, the share of price only 
auctions is about one third. In the sub-sample that organized procurements during both periods in 
our data, the share is about one fifth. For this sub-sample, we can also check whether those munici-
palities, which allowed the lowest bidder to win often in the beauty contests of the old regime, were 
more likely to organize price only auctions in the new regime. They indeed were. Conditional on a 
municipality letting the lowest bid to win in more than half of the beauty contests, the share of 
auctions that were price only in the new regime is 0.27. The corresponding share in the municipali-
ties that let the lowest bidder to win in less than half of the beauty contests is 0.13.  
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winning bids (even though they are not statistically significant at conventional lev-
els; see Model 1 of Table 7). In the right-hand graph, we restrict the direct effects 
to zero (as we did for Model 4 of Table 7). Both graphs show that the auction format 
has a clear indirect effect on the lowest bids via entry adjustments. Had entry re-
mained at the observed level of the beauty contests in the price only and scoring 
auctions, the lowest bids would have been clearly lower.  
  
[FIGURE 1 HERE] 
 
 Our finding that there is less entry in the price only and scoring auctions than 
in beauty contests is consistent with what Decarolis (2013) has documented for 
Italian procurements on public works, where first-price auctions were substituted 
for average bid auctions: Procurement rules that give a more explicit and prominent 
role for the price may reduce entry incentives. However, we do not find significant 
decreases in the winning bids (procurement costs), which is unlike what Decarolis 
finds in his companion paper (Decarolis 2014). In that paper, Decarolis also shows 
that the first price auctions resulted in poorer ex post performance.  
 The structural analysis of Lewis and Bajari (2011) points to strong entry ef-
fects of using a scoring auction, relative to what they call ‘standard contracts’ 
(where there is only a minimum threshold in the non-price dimension). Their anal-
ysis also suggests that direct procurement costs are about 7-8% higher in the scoring 
auctions (which were more than compensated by the social savings from quicker 
completion of the road works). We find no clear differences in the actual number 
of bidders or bids between the price only and scoring auctions.  
 Our findings also complement those of Coviello and Mariniello (2014), who 
show that greater transparency (publicity requirements) leads to more entry and 
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lower procurement costs. To the extent that beauty contests are less transparent and 
more subject to suspicions of favoritism than price only and scoring auctions, our 
findings suggest that the dimension(s) in which procurement transparency and ‘in-
tegrity’ are increased matters a great deal for procurement outcomes. Transparency 
may come at the cost of reduced entry.  
 Finally, the prior literature on endogenous participation and selective entry 
suggests that a primary channel through which the adjustment to the features of 
different auction designs takes place is the number and type of bidders who actually 
select to enter e.g. (Li and Zhang 2010, Li and Zheng 2012, Athey, Coey and Levin 
2013, Roberts and Sweeting 2013, Coviello and Mariniello 2014). In our data, such 
a channel appears to be at work, too. We find that entry restrictions imposed by the 
procurement bureaucrats matter for actual entry and that the precise mechanism 
may depend on the type of auction format. Our conditional logit estimates showed 
that inhouse-units were more likely to be chosen in the beauty contests. Moreover, 
Table A1 (see Appendix 3) reveals that the participation probabilities of inhouse-
units are clearly lower in scoring and price only auction than in beauty contests, as 
is their probability of winning conditional on participation. If the success of the 
inhouse-units in the beauty contests was based on their superior quality, one would 
not have expected that their participation and winning probabilities decreased in the 
new regime. In contrast, our findings would be in line with their winning probabil-
ities in the beauty contests resting on them enjoying some sort of favoritism (e.g., 
McAfee and McMillan 1989).  
 Taken together, these results suggest that how to properly regulate bidder par-
ticipation may be context specific (Bhattacharya, Roberts and Sweeting 2014). For 
example, it seems natural to think that when there are non-negligible entry costs, 
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the least efficient firms’  incentive to enter is weakened if the decision maker be-
comes significantly more price-sensitive in an auction that permits non-price award 
criteria. When the potential participants obtain private signals about their costs prior 
to making the entry choice (Gentry and Li 2014, Roberts and Sweeting 2013), such 
a behavioral change may make entry more selective. It may even work as a substi-
tute for the direct regulation of bidder participation.  
 
5 Conclusions 
The fight against inappropriate and inefficient practices in public procurement takes 
many forms. Recommendations for greater integrity, transparency and adoption of 
rule-based practices are widespread. For example, the US Federal Acquisition Reg-
ulations appear to strongly encourage the use of transparent auction mechanisms. 
Tadelis (2012, p. 301-302) summarizes the motivation of such policy by concluding 
that “[a]llowing for greater discretion in contractor selection increases the possibil-
ity of favoritism, kick-backs and political corruption” and that “[t]he competitive 
bidding system is less prone to corruption since it allows for free entry by qualified 
bidders and there is an objective criteria for selecting the winner”; see also Klem-
perer (2002) for a similar view.  
The stricter EC procurement directives and Swedish procurement law dis-
ciplined the behavior of procurement bureaucrats in two ways. It induced them to 
replace beauty contests with more transparent price only and scoring auctions and 
resulted in a more entry-friendly practices and price-sensitive designs. The stricter 
procurement law thereby increased the integrity of procurement practices, and led 
to decreased participation and winning probabilities of the inhouse-units. We do not 
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find evidence that the procurement costs would have decreased as a result. The rea-
son appears to be that the greater integrity resulted in reduced entry. The appropriate 
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# of auctions Free entry # of submitted bids # of qualified bids Potential entry
Beauty_contest 720 0.57 7.44 7.44 18.62
Scoring 240 0.96 5.97 5.92 18.70
Price_only 115 0.97 5.50 5.19 18.10
Total / sample 1,075 0.70 6.91 6.86 18.58
Minimum bid Winning bid Lowest bid wins Chosen bid gap Chosen bid gap, > 0
Beauty_contest 0.53 0.64 0.42 0.25 0.43
Scoring 0.63 0.67 0.65 0.07 0.20
Price_only 0.65 0.65 1.00 0.00 -
Total / sample 0.57 0.65 0.53 0.18 0.39
Mean rank of win Mean bid Median bid Coeff. of variation Kurtosis
Beauty_contest 2.59 0.78 0.76 0.26 2.4
Scoring 1.63 0.86 0.83 0.23 2.18
Price_only 1 0.81 0.79 0.17 2.02
Total / sample 2.20 0.8 0.78 0.24 2.32
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of auctions and bids
Within-auction statistics





Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Bid*Beauty_contest -4.058*** -3.934*** -3.948*** -3.948*** -4.681***
(0.278) (0.278) (0.285) (0.285) (0.351)
Bid*Scoring -6.905*** -6.664*** -7.142*** -7.015*** -7.884***
(1.054) (1.058) (1.069) (1.056) (1.302)
Firm-level controls:
  # of bids in the procurement - 0.198 - - -
(0.823)
  # of bids in the data - 0.082*** - - -
(0.012)
Firm type -dummies:
    National*Beauty_contest - - -1.443*** -1.443*** -
(0.111) (0.111)
    Regional*Beauty_contest - - -2.016*** -2.016*** -
(0.134) (0.134)
    Local*Beauty_contest - - -2.148*** -2.148*** -
(0.167) (0.167)
    National*Scoring - - -0.311 - -
(1.211)
    Regional*Scoring - - -0.357 - -
(1.208)
    Local*Scoring - - -0.036 - -
(1.227)
Omitted firm type - - Inhouse Inhouse -
Firm FE No No No No Yes
Price only -auctions Excluded Excluded Excluded Excluded Excluded
  Implied coefficient, if could be  included: 
    Bid*Price_only     
Observations 6,783 6,783 6,783 6,783 6,783
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1















Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Scoring 0.393*** 0.399*** 0.362*** 0.350***
(0.093) (0.110) (0.119) (0.120)
Price_only 0.400*** 0.328*** 0.272* 0.350***
(0.093) (0.102) (0.151) (0.120)
Controls No No Yes Yes
Municipal FE No Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,075 1,075 1,067 1,067
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
In model 4, the coefficients of the auction types were restricted to be the same.










(Poisson) (Poisson) (OLS) (OLS)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Scoring -0.025 -0.027 -0.014 -0.012
(0.223) (0.194) (0.266) (0.218)
Price_only -0.203 -0.197 -0.235 -0.239
(0.269) (0.217) (0.262) (0.238)
Free_entry 0.455*** 0.455*** 0.473*** 0.473***
(0.126) (0.126) (0.113) (0.113)
Free_entry * Scoring -0.374* -0.372* -0.425* -0.427**
(0.218) (0.193) (0.241) (0.206)
Free_entry * Price_only -0.365 -0.372* -0.432 -0.427**
(0.321) (0.193) (0.323) (0.206)
Ln(Potential entry) 0.365*** 0.365*** 0.329*** 0.329***
(0.105) (0.102) (0.090) (0.087)
Municipal FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,067 1,067 1,067 1,067
In model 2 and 4, the coefficient of the interactions were restricted to be the same.
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 4: Actual entry -regressions







Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Ln(Submitted_no_of_bids) -0.425* -0.479** -0.253 -0.409* -0.363*
(0.221) (0.231) (0.253) (0.213) (0.204)
Scoring -0.014 -0.038 -1.004 - -
(0.135) (0.136) (0.953)
Price_only -0.136 -0.155 -1.032 - -
(0.175) (0.178) (0.883)
Ln(Submitted_no_of_bids)*Scoring - - 0.567 - -
(0.536)
Ln(Submitted_no_of_bids)*Price_only - - 0.567 - -
(0.536)
Ln(Potential entry) 0.168 0.175 0.002 0.164 0.143
(0.129) (0.131) (0.204) (0.129) (0.124)
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipal FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm type dummies No Yes No No No
Observations 7,364 7,364 7,364 7,364 7,364
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Instruments
Model 1: {Free_entry, Free_entry*Scoring, Free_entry*Price_only}
Model 2: {Free_entry, Free_entry*Scoring, Free_entry*Price_only}
Model 3: {Free_entry, Free_entry*Scoring, Free_entry*Price_only}
Model 4: {Free_entry, Free_entry*Scoring, Free_entry*Price_only}
Model 5: {Free_entry, Free_entry*Scoring, Free_entry*Price_only, Scoring, Price_only}
In model 3, the coefficient of the interactions were restricted to be the same.
In the 1st stage, the coefficients of Free_entry*Scoring and Free_entry*Price_only were restricted to be the same. 
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses







Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Ln(Submitted_no_of_bids) -0.654*** -0.612*** -0.646*** -0.578*** -0.472***
(0.233) (0.207) (0.218) (0.203) (0.182)
Scoring -0.034 -0.028 -0.545 - -
(0.156) (0.154) (3.026)
Price_only -0.251 -0.229 -0.692 - -
(0.219) (0.216) (2.620)
Ln(Submitted_no_of_bids)*Scoring - - 0.319 - -
(1.876)
Ln(Submitted_no_of_bids)*Price_only - - 0.319 - -
(1.876)
Ln(Potential entry) 0.163 0.146 0.098 0.145 0.107
(0.126) (0.113) (0.388) (0.122) (0.107)
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipal FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm type dummies No Yes No No No
Observations 1,067 1,067 1,067 1,067 1,067
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Instruments
Model 1: {Free_entry, Free_entry*Scoring, Free_entry*Price_only}
Model 2: {Free_entry, Free_entry*Scoring, Free_entry*Price_only}
Model 3: {Free_entry, Free_entry*Scoring, Free_entry*Price_only}
Model 4: {Free_entry, Free_entry*Scoring, Free_entry*Price_only}
Model 5: {Free_entry, Free_entry*Scoring, Free_entry*Price_only, Scoring, Price_only}
In model 3, the coefficient of the interactions were resticted to be the same.
In the 1st stage, the coefficients of Free_entry*Scoring and Free_entry*Price_only were restricted to be the same. 
Table 6: Log(minimum bid), 2SLS







Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Ln(Submitted_no_of_bids) -0.814*** -0.741*** -0.815*** -0.656*** -0.512***
(0.255) (0.219) (0.262) (0.217) (0.193)
Scoring -0.138 -0.116 -0.114 - -
(0.179) (0.169) (4.100)
Price_only -0.449* -0.401* -0.429 - -
(0.251) (0.237) (3.520)
Ln(Submitted_no_of_bids)*Scoring - - -0.015 - -
(2.551)
Ln(Submitted_no_of_bids)*Price_only - - -0.015 - -
(2.551)
Ln(Potential entry) 0.226 0.210* 0.229 0.192 0.140
(0.143) (0.126) (0.525) (0.136) (0.118)
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipal FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm type dummies No Yes No No No
Observations 1,067 1,067 1,067 1,067 1,067
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Instruments
Model 1: {Free_entry, Free_entry*Scoring, Free_entry*Price_only}
Model 2: {Free_entry, Free_entry*Scoring, Free_entry*Price_only}
Model 3: {Free_entry, Free_entry*Scoring, Free_entry*Price_only}
Model 4: {Free_entry, Free_entry*Scoring, Free_entry*Price_only}
Model 5: {Free_entry, Free_entry*Scoring, Free_entry*Price_only, Scoring, Price_only}
In model 3, the coefficient of the interactions were restricted to be the same.
In the 1st stage, the coefficients of Free_entry*Scoring and Free_entry*Price_only were restricted to be the same. 
Table 7: Log(winning bid), 2SLS








Ln(Submitted_no_of_bids) (0.1, 0.1) (-0.1, -0.1) (0.1, 0.0) (0.0, 0.1) (-0.1, 0.0) (0.0, -0.1) (0.0, 0.0)
Coefficient -1.046 -0.583 -1.035 -0.825 -0.593 -0.804 -0.814
p-value 0.002 0.084 0.002 0.015 0.079 0.017 0.016




















Beauty contest Scoring Price only





















Beauty contest Scoring Price only










Beauty contest Scoring Price only
Ln(win_bid), Model 4 of Table 7
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Appendix 1. Regulation of the choice of the supplier  
Old regulation – Regime 1 
COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 92/50/EEC of 18 June 1992 relating to the coordination of procedures 
for the award of public service contract: CHAPTER 3 Criteria for the award of contracts Article 
36: 
 
1. Without prejudice to national laws, regulations or administrative provisions on the re-
muneration of certain services, the criteria on which the contracting authority shall base 
the award of contracts may be: 
 
a. where the award is made to the economically most advantageous tender, various 
criteria relating to the contract: for example, quality, technical merit, aesthetic 
and functional characteristics, technical assistance and after-sales service, de-
livery date, delivery period or period of completion, price; or  
 
b. the lowest price only. 
 
2. Where the contract is to be awarded to the economically most advantageous tender, the 
contracting authority shall state in the contract documents or in the tender notice the 
award criteria which it intends to apply, where possible in descending order of im-
portance.  
 
New regulation – Regime 2 
Directive 2004/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 on the 
coordination of procedures for the award of public works contracts, public supply contracts 
and public service contracts. Section 3, Award of the contract, Article 53, Contract award cri-
teria:  
 
1. Without prejudice to national laws, regulations or administrative provisions concerning 
the remuneration of certain services, the criteria on which the contracting authorities 
shall base the award of public contracts shall be either: 
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a.  when the award is made to the tender most economically advantageous from 
the point of view of the contracting authority, various criteria linked to the sub-
ject-matter of the public contract in question, for example, quality, price, tech-
nical merit, aesthetic and functional characteristics, environmental characteris-
tics, running costs, cost-effectiveness, after-sales service and technical assis-
tance, delivery date and delivery period or period of completion, or 
 
b. the lowest price only. 
 
2. Without prejudice to the provisions of the third subparagraph, in the case referred to in par-
agraph 1(a) the contracting authority shall specify in the contract notice or in the contract doc-
uments or, in the case of a competitive dialogue, in the descriptive document, the relative 
weighting which it gives to each of the criteria chosen to determine the most economically 
advantageous tender. 
 
Those weightings can be expressed by providing for a range with an appropriate maximum 
spread. 
 
Where, in the opinion of the contracting authority, weighting is not possible for demonstrable 
reasons, the contracting authority shall indicate in the contract notice or contract documents or, 
in the case of a competitive dialogue, in the descriptive document, the criteria in descending 
order of importance. 
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Appendix 2. Details on the discrete choice model 
As explained in the main text, we use the random utility model (McFadden 1974) to study the 
choice of the winning bid. To describe the model, let the municipalities be indexed by m, 
1,...,m M , premises to be cleaned by i, 1,..., mi I , and bidders (firms) by j, 1,..., mij J . The 
indirect utility of municipality m from choosing bidder j to clean building i is: 
 
1 2( _ ) 'mij mi mi mi mij j mij mijU Beauty contest Scoring bid F q             , (A1) 
where mi  refers to the additively separable effects of municipal/procurement/object charac-
teristics (including the format of the auction), mijbid  to the bid (price) of firm j for object i in 
municipality m (in krona per square meter per day), Beauty_contestmi and Scoringmi  to the two 
auction formats used in auction i of municipality m, 
jF  to firm attributes, mijq  to ‘quality’, and 
mij  to an error term.  
 The municipal/procurement/object characteristics, mi , reflect the mean utility that mu-
nicipality m obtains when it has its premises cleaned and the object-specific deviations from 
the mean. It thus captures all additively separable effects of observable and unobservable mu-
nicipal characteristics on municipal utility, e.g., regional structure, demographics, income dis-
tribution, voter preferences, and propensity to procure services. The term also refers to (un)ob-
servable object characteristics, such as the type, size, location, etc. of the object. It captures 
differences in the indirect utility derived, e.g., from having a clean health center as compared 
to having clean sports facilities. The assumed additive separability of these effects and the 
distributional (logit) assumption on the error term (see below) allow us to condition all these 
effects out in the estimation. The term controls in addition for the additively separable effects 
on the utility of those characteristics of the procurement event that do not vary over the bidding 
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firms, such as whether or not entry to the auction was open, which auction format was used, 
and whether or not the object was auctioned as a part of a multi-object procurement.  
 The second term in (A1) specifies the effect of a submitted bid on the choice, with the 
coefficient measuring the weight given to the bid. The interaction terms allow us to explore 
whether the weight attached to price is different between the two auction formats.  
 The third term in (A1), 
jF , allow us to capture the possibility that there are firm-specific, 
as opposed to object-specific, quality differences (i.e., ex ante corporate-level quality differ-
ences). For example, a piece of information in the bids in which the firms are able to ‘differen-
tiate themselves’ (besides the price) is the corporate identity of the bidder. This may e.g. convey 
information about its experience. To capture this, we use firm-type dummies or fixed effects 
in some specifications. We can also alternatively include the number of bids a firm submits 
during the entire sample period (to proxy reputation) and the number of bids a firm submits in 
a given procurement event (to capture elements of “combinatorial bidding”, if any). 
 The fourth term in (A1), mijq , refers to non-price attributes. It allows for the possibility 
that municipalities care about the quality of cleaning of a particular object for which firms are 
bidding (i.e., ex ante object-level quality differences). The extensive documentation available 
to us on the technical specifications of the procurements and the specifics of the bids however 
suggest that it is likely that there are no major ex ante quality differences at the object-level. 
That is, conditional on the corporate identity of the bidders, it is not likely that there are large, 
ex ante discernible quality differences between the bids for a specific object. As we explained 
in the main text, the most compelling support for this claim is provided by the technical speci-
fications of the procurement instructions from the old regime: These are in general very de-
tailed, leaving very little room for a firm to differentiate one-self quality-wise, conditional on 
 52 
jF .
1 Further supporting evidence comes from interviews that we conducted and especially the 
type of service we are studying.  
 The last term in (A1), mij , is a stochastic error term that captures intrinsic randomness 
in municipality decision making. Given mi , the error term only contains bidder-object specific 
unobservables. It therefore allows for idiosyncrasies in the decision-making of the procurement 
bureaucrats. We assume that mij  was unobservable to bidders and distributed i.i.d. type I ex-
treme value. 
 Given the above assumptions, and imposing the approximation 0mijq  , the probability 



















        (A2) 
where 
 1 2( _ ) 'miw mi mi mi miw wU Beauty contest Scoring bid F           
 1 2( _ ) 'mij mi mi mi mij jU Beauty contest Scoring bid F          . 
As specified, the model corresponds to the standard conditional logit model and can be esti-
mated by maximum likelihood (ML).  
 
                                                 
1 In addition, the submitted bids that we were able to examine for the old regime reveal that firms almost without 
exception only detail i) the object for which the firm is bidding, ii) the name and contact information of the bidder, 
iii) and the price, despite the forms providing space for additional information. If such information is provided, it 
is invariably uninformative as to potential quality differences. A typical piece of extra information is that the firm 
j plans to use certain substance S in cleaning, say, school i. The procurement instructions however always dictate 
in detail the environmental aspects of the substances to be used, and the extra information provided by firm j is 
that substance S fulfills these criteria. This also suggests that the firms were not able to differentiate themselves 
quality-wise in the bids. 
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# of bids National Regional Local Inhouse
Beauty_contest 5,359 0.30 0.42 0.20 0.08
Scoring 1,435 0.33 0.50 0.16 0.00
Price_only 633 0.36 0.55 0.08 0.02
Total / sample 7,427 0.31 0.44 0.18 0.06
# of auctions National Regional Local Inhouse
Beauty_contest 720 0.36 0.24 0.09 0.30
Scoring 240 0.44 0.43 0.13 0.00
Price_only 115 0.43 0.54 0.02 0.01
Total / sample 1,075 0.39 0.32 0.09 0.20
# of auctions National Regional Local Inhouse
Beauty_contest 720 0.38 0.28 0.13 0.51
Scoring 240 0.44 0.46 0.23 0.14
Price_only 115 0.47 0.59 0.07 0.10
Total / sample 1,075 0.40 0.36 0.15 0.49
Panel C: Winning frequencies, conditional on at least one firm of a given type participating
Panel A: Participation frequencies, i.e., the fraction of bids submitted
Table A1: Frequency of participation and winning, by firm type







(Poisson) (Poisson) (OLS) (OLS)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Scoring -0.143 0.011 -0.108 0.107
(0.197) (0.175) (0.212) (0.197)
Price_only -0.086 -0.149 -0.021 -0.120
(0.191) (0.191) (0.221) (0.216)
Free_entry 0.453*** 0.459*** 0.468*** 0.474***
(0.124) (0.126) (0.111) (0.112)
Free_entry * Scoring -0.249 -0.414*** -0.324* -0.548***
(0.164) (0.151) (0.167) (0.173)
Free_entry * Price_only -0.524*** -0.414*** -0.693*** -0.548***
(0.188) (0.151) (0.217) (0.173)
ln(Potential entry) 0.359*** 0.365*** 0.317*** 0.328***
(0.103) (0.102) (0.089) (0.088)
Municipal FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,067 1,067 1,067 1,067
In model 2 and 4, the coefficient of the interactions were restricted to be the same.
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table A2: Entry-regressions
(Alternative measure for free entry)





Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Ln(Submitted_no_of_bids) -0.403* -0.455** -0.276 -0.369* -0.349*
(0.212) (0.221) (0.212) (0.204) (0.198)
Scoring -0.008 -0.031 -0.903 - -
(0.133) (0.134) (0.673)
Price_only -0.128 -0.146 -0.941 - -
(0.171) (0.174) (0.634)
Ln(Submitted_no_of_bids)*Scoring - - 0.508 - -
(0.366)
Ln(Submitted_no_of_bids)*Price_only - - 0.508 - -
(0.366)
Ln(Potential entry) 0.158 0.165 0.022 0.145 0.136
(0.126) (0.128) (0.159) (0.125) (0.122)
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipal FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm type dummies No Yes No No No
Observations 7,364 7,364 7,364 7,364 7,364
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Instruments
Model 1: {Free_entry, Free_entry*Scoring, Free_entry*Price_only}
Model 2: {Free_entry, Free_entry*Scoring, Free_entry*Price_only}
Model 3: {Free_entry, Free_entry*Scoring, Free_entry*Price_only}
Model 4: {Free_entry, Free_entry*Scoring, Free_entry*Price_only}
Model 5: {Free_entry, Free_entry*Scoring, Free_entry*Price_only, Scoring, Price_only}
In model 3, the coefficient of the interactions were restricted to be the same.
Table A3: Log(bid), 2SLS, all bids




Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Ln(Submitted_no_of_bids) -0.599*** -0.561*** -0.645*** -0.442** -0.447***
(0.216) (0.196) (0.211) (0.173) (0.172)
Scoring -0.019 -0.014 -0.867 - -
(0.152) (0.151) (0.735)
Price_only -0.220 -0.200 -0.970 - -
(0.211) (0.210) (0.687)
Ln(Submitted_no_of_bids)*Scoring - - 0.519 - -
(0.431)
Ln(Submitted_no_of_bids)*Price_only - - 0.519 - -
(0.431)
Ln(Potential entry) 0.145 0.129 0.059 0.096 0.098
(0.118) (0.107) (0.112) (0.103) (0.103)
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipal FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm type dummies No Yes No No No
Observations 1,067 1,067 1,067 1,067 1,067
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Instruments
Model 1: {Free_entry, Free_entry*Scoring, Free_entry*Price_only}
Model 2: {Free_entry, Free_entry*Scoring, Free_entry*Price_only}
Model 3: {Free_entry, Free_entry*Scoring, Free_entry*Price_only}
Model 4: {Free_entry, Free_entry*Scoring, Free_entry*Price_only}
Model 5: {Free_entry, Free_entry*Scoring, Free_entry*Price_only, Scoring, Price_only}
In model 3, the coefficient of the interactions were restricted to be the same.
Table A4: Log(minimum bid), 2SLS
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Ln(Submitted_no_of_bids) -0.743*** -0.683*** -0.800*** -0.483*** -0.484***
(0.239) (0.209) (0.223) (0.185) (0.184)
Scoring -0.119 -0.100 -1.160 - -
(0.172) (0.164) (0.777)
Price_only -0.410* -0.369 -1.331* - -
(0.239) (0.229) (0.730)
Ln(Submitted_no_of_bids)*Scoring - - 0.637 - -
(0.454)
Ln(Submitted_no_of_bids)*Price_only - - 0.637 - -
(0.454)
Ln(Potential entry) 0.203 0.191 0.098 0.130 0.130
(0.135) (0.120) (0.126) (0.115) (0.114)
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Municipal FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm type dummies No Yes No No No
Observations 1,067 1,067 1,067 1,067 1,067
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Instruments
Model 1: {Free_entry, Free_entry*Scoring, Free_entry*Price_only}
Model 2: {Free_entry, Free_entry*Scoring, Free_entry*Price_only}
Model 3: {Free_entry, Free_entry*Scoring, Free_entry*Price_only}
Model 4: {Free_entry, Free_entry*Scoring, Free_entry*Price_only}
Model 5: {Free_entry, Free_entry*Scoring, Free_entry*Price_only, Scoring, Price_only}
In model 3, the coefficient of the interactions were restricted to be the same.
Table A5: Log(winning bid), 2SLS
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses
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